Trieste Betrayed: How the Free Territory Was Buried by US Geopolitics

By Alessandro Gombač

Abstract

At the height of the Cold War, the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) — established by the 1947 Peace Treaty — was progressively emptied of meaning and eventually abandoned. Not due to technical limits or diplomatic obstacles, but because of a deliberate political choice by the United States, as revealed by Leonard Unger, a senior State Department official directly involved in the negotiations.

In this documented and urgent historical reconstruction, Unger’s 1989 testimony is interwoven with the critical perspectives of historians like Giampaolo Valdevit and Bogdan Novak, restoring to the FTT its full geopolitical and legal depth. From the birth of a multilateral project to its quiet burial in 1948 and 1954, the story reveals how Trieste was transformed from an international bridge into a strategic pawn.

Today, with the Adriatic once again central to global trade routes, the long-buried story of Trieste reemerges — starting with the cold, lucid voice of the American system that admitted everything.

Leonard Unger, the Voice of the State Department

The Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) was more than a diplomatic footnote: it was, at least initially, a serious attempt to establish a neutral and international zone in a Europe still split between East and West. A free port embedded in Mitteleuropa, the final echo of Churchill’s federal vision from Tehran in 1943. Not coincidentally, the Soviet Union supported its realization for years, linking its withdrawal from Vienna to the full implementation of the FTT’s Permanent Statute.

But history is often the graveyard of good intentions. Leonard Unger, a senior U.S. State Department official and direct participant in the postwar negotiations, said so plainly. In a 1989 interview for the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Unger revealed how the FTT project was gradually dismantled from within, until it became what it really was: a temporary geopolitical buffer between Italy and Yugoslavia, sacrificed to Cold War logic and the Italian elections of 1948.

In 1946, Unger was on the ground as a geographic expert for the Allied Commission. He visited contested territories, listened to communities, and measured ethnic, linguistic, and strategic fault lines. His conclusion was blunt:

“The idea was to draw a line […] leaving the minimum of the other nationality on the ‘wrong’ side of the boundary.” — Leonard Unger

But no such line could be found. The only viable solution was to remove the entire area from national sovereignty and create a Free Territory. A technical, neutral fix that, on paper, respected the region’s plural identity. The 1947 Peace Treaty codified this vision, and the Soviet Union firmly defended it, refusing to leave Vienna until the FTT’s full legal framework was in place.

Everything changed in the spring of 1948. The U.S. feared Italy might fall into the Soviet orbit. With elections approaching, the FTT — once a multilateral solution — became dead weight. The decisive move came with the Tripartite Declaration of March 20, 1948, in which the U.S., UK, and France unilaterally announced that the Free Territory of Trieste should return to Italy.

“Once the declaration was made […] it was perfectly clear that a Free Territory of Trieste […] was not going to be realized.” — Leonard Unger

“This declaration had considerable impact on the voters in Italy, reduced the pro-Communist vote, and Italy stayed with the West.” — Leonard Unger

Meanwhile, British military governor Sir Terence Airey refused to grant FTT citizenship to residents of Zone A, insisting that such powers belonged to the (never-appointed) Governor. In contrast, Yugoslavia had already issued FTT citizenship in Zone B as early as 1947 — if only to block any future Italian claim. Two zones, two visions of sovereignty.

The London Memorandum of 1954 sealed the backroom deal: Zone A to Italy, Zone B to Yugoslavia. No ratification, no Treaty revision, no involvement of international legal bodies. Just a fait accompli, quietly filed away in the archives.

“It was recognized that Trieste would be a kind of economic monstrosity.” — Leonard Unger

The borders were literally drawn on a large-scale map by Unger himself:

“Minor territorial details were worked out on a large-scale map by Thompson’s and Velebit’s assistants in London, Unger and Primozic.”

Both Scelba and Tito carefully avoided any mention of “sovereignty,” speaking only of an “extension of civil administration” — to avoid violating the Peace Treaty, which would have required full multilateral revision.

“Scelba […] used the phrase ‘extension of civil administration’ in Zones A and B for Italy and Yugoslavia respectively, and avoided any reference to ‘sovereignty’.

” Scelba […] ha usato l’espressione “estensione dell’amministrazione civile” nelle zone A e B rispettivamente per Italia e Jugoslavia, ed ha evitato qualsiasi riferimento alla “sovranità”.

The Treaty of Osimo (October 1, 1975) marked the formal political recognition of the 1954 status quo, with Italy and Yugoslavia renouncing mutual claims. But this happened without revising the 1947 Peace Treaty and without any UN endorsement. It was merely a bilateral political ratification of a fait accompli.

Even U.S. diplomatic sources admit:

“The London Memorandum has the further effect of amending (albeit not formally) the clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty of 1946 which created the Free Territory of Trieste.”

In short: neither the London Memorandum nor the Osimo Treaty ever formally revoked the FTT’s legal status. They bypassed international law, leaving the FTT alive in legal terms, if politically buried.

5. A Still-Unresolved Question

“It may be that the people of Trieste will wish to reopen the question, especially if Italy faces economic crisis. They might look to the hinterland and demand autonomy, or even the city’s internationalization.” — Bogdan Novak, “Trieste 1941–1954”

And Giampaolo Valdevit warned in 1994:

“Trieste found itself trapped between two opposing forms of provisionality. […] There remains the doubt that it simply wasn’t enough.” — Valdevit, “Trieste 1953–1954”

His geological metaphor still resonates:

“The erratic boulder disappears as such, but left some debris — especially in Trieste. There, provisionality sedimented into the local political culture, evolving into municipalism. […] There remains the doubt that it simply wasn’t enough.”

This metaphor describes not only the past but a possible future: Trieste as a boulder that could move again, nudged by new geopolitical shifts and the return of a Central European hinterland pressing against the Adriatic.

Conclusion: Trieste’s Return

The Free Territory of Trieste was not a fraud from the start. It was a real multilateral project, then gradually dismantled for geopolitical convenience. Today, it’s not nostalgia that brings it back, but geography and global logistics.

Trieste’s natural role will not be restored by law, but by its 18-meter-deep port, by its strategic access to Hungary, Slovakia, Austria, and by the renewed axis of Eurasian trade routes. The city is again at the heart of tensions between the Belt and Road Initiative, the Trimarium, and the Cotton Route.

Trieste is no longer a buffer. It is once again a gateway. And the FTT dossier, buried for 80 years, might soon return. Not out of revisionism, but out of geopolitical necessity.