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TOP SECOND

I.P.T. 54

6 August 1951

Pages 1 - 20, incl

NATO SECRET

NATO

U.S. DRAFT

REPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL PLANNING TEAM

to the

STANDING GROUP

on

REGRADED -

YUGOSLAVIA

Per Authority

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the action that NATO should take in event of attack on Yugoslavia by Satellite or Soviet and Satellite forces:

ASSUMPTIONS

- 2. It is assumed that:
- a. An attack on Yugoslavia by Satellite forces along with Soviet logistic support (USSR covertly neutral) will be an attempt to localize the combat in Yugoslavia.
- b. An attack on Yugoslavia by Soviet forces with or without Satellite forces will probably precipitate a global war.
- c. Any overt international combat in Yugoslavia must be accepted as an increased threat of global war.
- d. In event Yugoslavia is attacked, she will accept any form of military arrangement with NATO which will preserve the sovereignty of the Yugoslavia state.
- e. The United Nations would take action to support Yugoslavia in event of overt attack against that nation. The Standing Group would act as the executive agent for the United Nations in the direction of NATO forces assisting Yugoslavia.
- <u>f.</u> A basic prerequisite to realistic planning for NATO support to Yugoslavia is the prior determination of the availability of operational bases and facilities for naval and air forces.

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

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See Enclosure "C" and Appendix I to Enclosure "C".


DISCUSSION

4. See Enclosure "D".

CONCLUSIONS

- 5. It is concluded that the Standing Group should:
- <u>a.</u> Initiate planning by the appropriate commanders to accomplish direct military support as appropriate to Yugo-slavia in the event of an overt attack by the USSR and/or Satellite forces against that country.
- <u>b.</u> At the earliest practicable time advise the Council Deputies and the Military Representatives Committee that it has initiated planning for NATO military support to Yugoslavia in event that nation is attacked and NATO military support is directed. Draft memorandum is attached as Enclosure "A".
- c. Transmit strategic guidance to SACEUR in order that he may develop his plans. Draft attached as Enclosure "&".









ENCLOSURE "A"

DRAFT NOTICE TO THE COUNCIL DEPUTIES

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
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
Secretary, Standing Group

TO:

Secretary, Council Deputies Military Representatives Committee


- Subject is planning for military support of Yugoslavia.
- The Standing Group evaluates the retention of an independent Yugoslavia, free from the bondage of international Communist chains to Moscow, as a strategic objective vitally important to the security of the NAT nations. Also, the Standing Group considers that a satellite attack on Yugoslavia in the near future must be regarded as a serious possibility.
- As a result of these conditions, the Standing Group, 3. in accordance with its terms of reference, has initiated planning on military action that NATO forces might take in support of Yugoslavia in event that country is attacked and NATO forces are directed to provide the support.
- Recent allocations of forces to SACEUR make it necessary that that command also initiate operational planning on its level. Strategic guidance has been provided SACEUR by the Standing Group to accomplish his planning. To complete sound plans it will be necessary for SACEUR to arrange military discussions between his organization and Yugoslav military officials.
- It is requested that the Council Deputies note that the Standing Group and SHAPE have initiated, without any political commitments, military planning with regard to Yugoslavia and advise the Standing Group at the earliest date that classified military discussions with the Yugoslavs would be permissible.
- The security implications of this subject are considered such that, in addition to the regular TOP SECRET - COSMIC provisions, distribution should be made only on a strictly need-to-know basis.











STRATEGIC GUIDANCE TO SACEUR

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FROM:

Secretary Standing Group


TO:

SACEUR

- The Standing Group desires that you initiate planning for direct military support to Yugoslavia in event that nation is attacked under the following conditions:
 - Objective: The objective of NATO military support to Yugoslavia is to enable the Yugoslav armed forces to conduct a defensive war which will insure the integrity of the Yugoslav armed forces, while at the same time, sacrificing the minimum of Yugoslav territory and engaging as many Soviet and/or Satellite divisions as possible.

Limitations:

- No military action or redeployment of forces should be undertaken in such a manner as to jeopardize materially the ability of NATO forces to defend NATO territory in event of attack.
- (2) No ground combat units, on anything but a token basis, will be moved into Yugoslav territory without [individual] specific prior approval by the Standing Group. This limits the immediate employment of forces to air and naval.
- (3) In event of global war, no NATO forces will be diverted from planned operations for the specific purpose of providing military support to Yugoslavia. c. Forces:
- Only forces allocated may be considered immediately available.
- (2) Forces earmarked will be made available but initially at a considerably slower rate than they would be available in event of full mobilization.





Enclosure "B"





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- d. Logistics: The provision of military supplies and equipment to Yugoslav forces will continue to be a bilateral SECRET function between NATO nations and Yugoslavia.
- 2. Classified military discussions with Yugoslav military officials will be undertaken at the direction of the Standing Group as soon as political approval is obtained.
- 3. It is desired that this planning be conducted on a priority second only to SHAPE emergency plans.
- 4. Six copies of completed plans are desired by the Standing Group. No distribution outside of SHAPE and its subordinate commands is desired.

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Enclosure "B"







ENCLOSURE "C"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- NATO SECRET
- 1. Future developments in Yugoslavia may present a threat to the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For historical and political considerations in connection with military planning with Yugoslavia see Appendix I to Enclosure "D".
- 2. Yugoslavia adjoins the NATO area. Provision is made for planning to meet a threat to security under such conditions in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
- 3. MC 14, paragraph 5 h contains the assumption that, in event of war, the Soviets would probably have to employ force to utilize Yugoslav territory if the present regime in Yugoslavia is still in control.
- 4. Unilateral national planning for military support to Yugoslavia has been affected by allocation of national military forces (in event of attack) to NATO Supreme Commands.
- of the present inadequacy of air base facilities and because of the inadvisability of basing naval operations in the restricted waters of the Adriatic Sea. From the tactical standpoint alone, Italian and Greek bases, United Kingdom bases in the British Isles and in the Mediterranean area, and French bases on the Continent and in North Africa would be desirable.
- 6. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will gain definite strategic advantages by the denial of Yugoslavia to the Soviet orbit. With its geographic position and an army of thirty divisions, an independent Yugoslavia can serve as a shield, protecting the NATO position in the Adriatic, the Central and Eastern Mediterranean, and will add to NATO strength in the general African and Near Eastern area.







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- 7. Soviet success in destroying the Tito regime and supplant SECRET ing it by a government subservient to Moscow would represent a serious strategic and political reverse for the North Atlantic Community; it would re-establish Soviet power on the entire eastern shore of the Adriatic, remove and intensify threats to the internal and external security of Greece, expose Italy to Soviet influences and pressure, complicate the Western position in Trieste and otherwise provide increased momentum to Soviet expansion of possibly grave global consequence.
- 8. Soviet subjection of Yugoslavia would have a tremendous psychological impact on the North Atlantic Community and constitute a blow to the influence and morale of the United Nations, of which Yugoslavia is a member. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have indicated general agreement that the maintenance of Yugoslavia's ability to defend its independence is highly important to the security of the North Atlantic area and would be obliged to confront the problem of taking effective countermeasures if Soviet tactics were successful in delaying or blocking effective United Nations actions.
- 9. The Armed forces of Yugoslavia, especially as considered together with the Armed forces of Greece and Turkey, represent a military factor which could be of great importance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other allied countries in the event of a general war with the USSR. Consequently, the maintenance of Yugoslav military strength and morale at the point of maximum feasible effectiveness to meet a Soviet or Satellite attack serves the strategic interests of the North Atlantic Community.
- 10. The Tito heresy represents a rift in the international communist movement, challenging Kremlin control of world communism as an instrument of Soviet imperialism. The loss of a Satellite is a great blow to Soviet prestige, and national communism or Titoism has great potentialities as an ideological factor weakening Soviet power and influence throughout the world of presently

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incalculable consequences. Inasmuch as Soviet success in liquidating the Tito regime would have a profound and perhaps decisive influence upon those communist elements which are resisting the absolute control of the Kremlin under the inspiration of Tito's successful resistance, it is important to the North Atlantic Community that Tito maintains this resistance.

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Enclosure "C"





DISCUSSION

NATO SECRET

Importance of Yugoslavia

It is of great importance to NATO that Yugoslavia remain free of Soviet domination. With less than a hundred thousand square miles and a population of sixteen million, Yugoslavia sprawls across many climates and cultures. Among the Balkan powers she ranks second to none in military strength. Yugoslavia -- meaning a country uniting the Southern Slavs -- was no artifical product of the Paris (1919) Peace Conference, but the result of the historical development of the various branches of the Yugoslav peoples. She combined the former independent kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro and the Yugoslav areas of the old Austria-Hungarian Empire -- Croatia and Slavonia (hitherto a part of Hungary), Dalmatia (previously an Austrian crownland) Bosnia and Herzegovina (formerly under the condominium of Austria and Hungary), the Slovenian regions of Austria (Krain and a section of Styria), and the Voivodina (formerly under Hungarian rule). To speak of Yugoslavia as a whole would belie facts. Four-fifths of Yugoslavia consists of mountains and hills; one-fifth only is lowland. drawn southward from Belgrade via Nish to Salonica and another line from Nish through Sofia, Philippopolis, and Adrianople to Istanbul would roughly indicate the main avenues of passage through this strategic area. The existence of two broad and divergent avenues, running respectively from south to north and from southeast to northwest, facilitates penetration from east, but conversely furnishes access to the frontier of the metropolitan USSR. Yugoslavia and Italy both extend along the shores of the strategic Adriatic. Their land frontiers are divided by the Carnic and Julian Alps which form a strong natural defensive barrier; however, this buffer is intersected by the Lyubliana pass (the Jave-Venezia-Julia corridor) which fans out onto the Veneto coastal plain via Thus the importance of Yugoslavia's continued independence to NATO and to the defense of Italy and of the North Atlantic area is substantiated by the following:







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a. A friendly Yugoslavia has 33 combat divisions which, in peace as well as in war, will immobilize a considerable number of Soviet forces which could otherwise be employed against NATO.

NATO SECRET

- <u>b.</u> Soviet domination of Yugoslavia would provide the USSR with a direct outlet to the Adriatic Sea and easy access to the Mediterranean. This would jeopardize the security of all Mediterranean lines of communication, as well as operations in the Mediterranean area.
- c. A neutral or friendly Yugoslavia will strengthen the right flank of NATO forces.
- <u>d</u>. A hostile Yugoslavia would jeopardize the security of Greece and would permit intensified Soviet pressure against Italy.

<u>Objective</u>

2. The broad objective of NATO military support to Yugoslavia is to enable the Yugoslav armed forces to conduct a defensive war which will insure the integrity of the Yugoslav armed forces, while at the same time, sacrificing the minimum of Yugoslav territory and engaging as many Soviet and/or Satellite divisions as possible. It is considered that the achievement of this initial objective would be a major blow to Soviet aspirations and would further serve to develop NATO solidarity in the common cause.

Limiting Factor

3. The basic factor which serves to limit any direct military support, exclusive of military equipment and supplies, in event of an overt attack against Yugoslavia is the inherent and and ever present possibility that any conflict in that area might well be the prelude to a larger attack on NAT nations. The NATO should not, in providing direct military support to Yugoslavia, take any military action, or deploy any forces in such manner as to jeopardize materially its ability to defend NATO territory in event of sudden attack.

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Enclosure "D"





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4. Acceptance of this principle precludes the employment of NATO NATO ground forces on anything but a token basis, if at all, and SECRET limits the immediate employment of naval and air forces.

Equipment.

5. Some bilateral assistance is now being arranged between at least one NATO nation and Yugoslavia in the provision of military arms, equipment and supplies. The provision of these items for NATO forces is basically a national responsibility. Hence, it is believed that NATO should not enter this field with regard to Yugoslavia unless some excesses develop, such as the Canadian surpluses. In that event, it is believed NATO should only suggest bilateral action for the assistance of Yugoslavia.

Forces

- 6. There are admitted political advantages to sending ground forces to assist Yugoslavia, but it is believed they are outweighed by the following disadvantages:
 - a. The force would, necessarily, be so small that it would have little effect on the campaign. Instead of demonstrating NATO determination, it would advertise NATO weakness.
 - b. There would be strong pressure to reinforce the small force which could develop full-scale military commitment.
 - c. It is understood the Yugoslav General Staff are not anxious for ground force assistance but consider that the most effective way in which help could be given would be by the provision of arms and direct support by air force and naval air units. Limited support might also be given by naval surface forces.
- 7. There has been some unilateral planning by member nations of NATO for naval and air support of Yugoslavia in event that nation is attacked. However, the bulk of these forces that would be immediately available for such operations have recently been allocated to SACEUR.



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8. Naval and air forces, other than those in the immediate area, that could be provided by NATO nations to assist Yugoslavia would naturally be those that have been earmarked for allocation to a Supreme Command. To move such forces into the vicinity of Yugoslavia and place them under SACEUR would improve his capability to meet a sudden attack.

NATO SECRET

- 9. It must be recognized that employment of any NATO forces against the satellites, and particularly against Hungary, will increase the threat to Allied forces in Austria and Trieste. Concurrently, with the preparation of plans for the employment of Allied forces in support of Yugoslavia, the Allied Commanders in Austria and Trieste should be apprised of the increased threat to their forces, and be directed to prepare plans for appropriate defensive measures.
- 10. In the event of global war, NATO should not divert any forces from planned operations for the specific purpose of providing military support to Yugoslavia.

Political Decisions

- 11. The decision as to whether NATO will provide direct military support to Yugoslavia under conditions of attack by Satellite forces or the Soviets with or without Satellite participation will necessarily have to be made as the result of consultations on political levels as provided in Article 4 of the NAT. Since Soviet ground forces could launch a major attack on Yugoslavia only through the territory of the Satellites, it is considered that any military plans prepared to provide support to Yugoslavia would be equally applicable whether or not organized forces of the Soviets are involved.
- 12. The development of sound plans for the military support of Yugoslavia is dependent upon the conduct of military discussions with Yugoslav military authorities. SACEUR is the proper individual to arrange such military discussions. The Council Deputies should

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Enclosure "D"





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be apprised of these facts and requested to authorize the Standing

Group to instruct SACEUR at the appropriate time.

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13. Any United Nations action, other than that under the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter might be similar to the present Korean action. However, it is considered vital that one major exception be provided. In the Korean action, there has been no question as to the conduct of air and naval operations against the territory of North Korea. No action has been taken against China. It is considered essential that military operations in support of Yugoslavia not be confined to Yugoslav territory but that direct military operations be permitted against any and all of the aggressor states and their territories.





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
APPENDIX I TO ENCLOSURE "D"

NATO SECRET

THE RISE OF TITO

- 1. After the Nazi conquest of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 two powerful resistance movements rapidly developed in spite of the ruthless German occupation. The first to attract world notice was the Chetnik movement of General Mikhailovitch, a Serb leader who organized bands of guerrilla fighters. Mikhailovitch, a professional soldier, was a Colonel in command of a mountain regiment when the Nazis seized his country. He organized peasant volunteers and Army remnants into guerrilla forces.
- 2. A career officer, he felt guerrilla raids were most effective in close support of regular forces; he wanted to conserve his strength, and wait for an Allied invasion of the Balkans. This program, in turn, coincided with British instructions to resistance groups all over Europe and with the desires of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, functioning under King Peter in London, which believed British troops would restore its rule.
- 3. Soon, however, another resistance leader challenged Mikhailovitch. Tito became the big name in Yugoslavia. Tito and Mikhailovitch were supposed to be fighting for the same cause, but this fact did not make them allies. Mikhailovitch called Tito a Communist and Tito labeled Mikhailovitch a Fascist. Each accused the other of seeking power at home instead of concentrating on the fight against the Germans. Tito even charged the Chetniks with helping the Nazis in their campaign to weaken the Partisans.
- 4. Russia supported Tito from the beginning. At first,
 Britain and the United States favored Mikhailovitch, but they were
 finally won over to Tito. The Nazis conquest of Yugoslavia found
 Tito living in Zagreb, but he did not become active in the resistance
 movement until Russia was invaded two months later. The Partisans
 then began their guerrilla war on the Nazis. Assuming leadership
 of the Partisans, Tito built up their strength from a mere handfull

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to an estimated force of 200,000. The Partisans were a political SECRE as well as a resistance movement; besides harassing the Nazis, they also fought the Chetniks of Mikhailovitch, Tito's rival for postwar power. With strong Russian sponsorship, Tito finally succeeded in getting Western Allies to accept him as the main leader of Yugoslav resistance.

- 5. Before the war was over, Tito, a Croatian by birth, extended his power over all Yugoslavia, assisted by not only Russia's help, but eventually by that of the Allies. This helped to a great degree to impose his dictatorship upon a lukewarm, if not unwilling, country. However, his prestige was at its height in the autumn of 1944, built up by the reports of his military exploits by Russia's propaganda agencies, and in the United States by the vociferous activities of Louis Adamic. At that time Tito's regime was at least accepted, if not actively supported, by a majority of the country, particularly the younger people hoping to rebuild a new Yugoslavia. At Yalta the Soviet government persuaded Roosevelt and Churchill to agree to a recognition formula for Tito's regime similar to what they had adopted for the Polish Lublin Committee; Tito's government was to be "broadened." Through a series of maneuvers and diplomatic pressures, the government-in-exile in London was forced by Washington and London to merge with Tito's cabinet. Dr. Subasitch, a careerist Croat politician, the first "Premier" of Tito's government, concluded the famous Moscow Agreement which gave the regime a facade of legality. But he was only a stopgap premier. The immediate purpose of his appointment was to grant Tito the political, administrative, and financial support which he needed and was able to obtain from Washington and London. sequently, Tito appointed himself Premier, with Subasitch as Foreign Affairs Minister for a while before his early passing into historical oblivion.
- With the advent or peace, into s machinery started to remodel the country along Russian lines. This meant tearing down a





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way of life which had changed little since the Middle Ages. On the liberation of any given area, administration was started through the local party representative acting under the direction of the Communist Control Executive, which had in its hand two powerful instruments for crushing any opposition — the Army and the Secret Police, the Ozna. The AVNOJ, a kind of transitional National Assembly, gave authority to ad hoc jurisdiction of the partisan control committees and of the previous Jajce Assembly. The law courts were turned into faithful servants of Tito's state and power of the Ozna soon covered every corner of the country.

- 7. Gradually, but persistently, Tito was able to strengthen his power. Serbia, Croatia, Slavenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia were named as six units of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The Constitution of January 1946, followed faithfully that of Soviet Russia. It brought foreign trade and numerous industries under government control, provided for central planning of the country's economic life, called for dividing up the greatest estates among small farmers. Like Russia's constitution, it provided for a two-house legislature, but placed supreme power in a special board called a Presidium.
- 8. In 1946, Tito wielded more personal power than any other man in Europe, except Stalin, and, with the same exception, he was perhaps the world's most successful proletarian statesman. Soviet troops, in accordance with Soviet principles, were first withdrawn after the war from Yugoslavia which was to become the initial experimental area in Europe for the new sort of empire building. Tito was to demonstrate the exemplary behavior of a Communist party in power. They would, the Russians thought, recognize the authority of the Kremlin as superior; if Yugoslavia's particular interests clashed with those of the Soviet Union, the former would be subordinated to the latter; Yugoslavia would help economically to rebuild and strengthen the mother country of all Communist nations and would gladly make sacrifices to achieve this.





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9. What actually happened is well known. No sooner had the SECRE Soviet troops left the country than the critical conflict between Yugoslav national communism and Russian communism of the imperialistic variety began its course. During 1946 it became grave; in 1947 the rift was so deep that a Cominfrom was created whose only purpose according to Yugoslav leaders was to arouse the fury of the International against Tito. In June 1948 the Yugoslavs were excluded from the Soviet orbit; soon all Soviet economic and military missions were withdrawn from Yugoslavia. The Soviet Empire lost a powerful ally, and its sphere of influence, which had stretched as far west as the Italian Carnic Alps shrank considerably.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO YUGOSLAVIA

- 10. The Kremlin break with Tito demonstrates, that the Russians can and do make mistakes. Tito dared to call Stalin's bluff. This is an aspect of the conflict which has not received the attention it deserves. But the fact remains that the head of this small vulnerable, almost completely encircled State, a State moreover, deficient in national unity, has opposed the Soviet Union more radically than any other power in Europe. For nearly three years (June 1948) Tito has maintained his position in face of the united execrations of his Cominform neighbors and threats of violence. For a great part of that time Yugoslavia has sustained with U.S. aid an economic blockade imposed at the time when the Yugoslav economy is at its most vulnerable to disintegration and collapse.
- ll. Tito has compelled the Russians to show the true logic of their policy towards the Satellites sooner and more precipitately than he would otherwise have done. For by defying Moscow so steadfastly he has compelled the Russians to admit in effect that their real interests lie not in the spread of the Communist ideology as such but, and for whatever purpose, in Russian imperialism. Furthermore, having once had to throw off its ideological camouflage, the Moscow Polituburo has given up all pretence behind the Iron Curtain everywhere that its interest is anything but dominion by force.

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The Kremlin has tried to pull Tito down. It has uttered threats of a kind probably never before heard in time of technical NATO SECRE peace between nations. It has demonstrated with troops on Yugoslavia's frontiers, and fomented incidents. It has appealed to anti-Tito elements inside Yugoslavia to rise against the Government and turn it out. Russia has declared that it is the solemn duty of Communists everywhere to fight against Tito. And, above all, it has imposed an economic blockade designed to ruin the Yugoslav economy -- a blockade, moreover, which is by no means painless for the other Satellites, especially Czechoslovakia and Poland, who have both suffered very heavily from their interrupted trade with Yugoslavia. But with all this, three years have passed. still in power, and the Kremlin has not yet tried the most effective way of removing him -- by means of war. Since the Kremlin has no moral scruples about war, the basic conclusion is that so far the Russians have felt that it cannot safely go to war with Yugoslavia. Titoism has developed into a major threat to the Soviet, primary objective of world Communism dictated from Moscow. Consequently, the overthrow of the present regime in Yugoslovia and the acquisition of that country must be considered as a cardinal objective of the Soviets by Yugoslavia and the West and probably one they must accomplish prior to launching an attack on the North Atlantic Treaty nations. Therefore, the preservation of an independent Yugoslavia is now an important strategic objective of the North Atlantic community as a deterrent to Soviet aggression against North Atlantic Treaty territories.

RESULTS

- 13. The present indications are:
- a. Tito's grip on the Communist party and the government of Yugoslavia is firm.
 - b. Yugoslavia will fight if attacked.
- c. Yugoslav security forces should be able to thwart any attempts on internal revolution.
- d. There is no prospect of Tito's return to the Kremlin graces.







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e. Economically Yugoslavia is suffering from a part overly ambitious industrial investment plan and the East economic blockade. U.S. emergency relief measures have practically eliminated the immediate food problem. Adjustment of the investment plan and further economic relief is programmed.

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14. Consequently, if the international Communists are to rectify the Yugoslav condition in the next few years, it appears it will require overt attack.

FORCES

- 15. a. For a recent estimate of forces of the Soviet and Satellite nations see S.G. 126/2.
 - b. If the Soviets decided to commit a material amount of their military forces against Yugoslavia there is little doubt that the Yugoslav forces unsupported would be promptly overrun. However, if NATO were able to provide some air and naval support, it is likely that Yugoslav forces could retain their unity and much of their equipment while withdrawing into the mountain hide-outs. Thereafter a small amount of assistance, as was rendered Mikhæilovitch and later Tito in the last war, would be sufficient to continue resistance. Such resistance would be highly beneficial to the NATO common cause.
 - c. As of this spring the estimates of forces of the Satellites were as follows:
 - (1) Army Forces

(a)	Albania	4 Divisions
(b)	Bulgaria	13 Divisions
(c)	Czechoslovakia	ll Divisions
(d)	Hungary	6 Divisions
(e)	Romania	12 Divisions

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- 19 - Appendix I to Enclosure "D"








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(2) Air Forces -- The above Satellite nations have small tactical air forces geared basically for ground support. However, their limited numbers, and low efficiency render them incapable of prolonged action outside their individual borders.

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- <u>d</u>. Even if the Soviets did direct the above nations to use the bulk of their forces and persuaded Poland to contribute about half of her forces, they still would be inadequate to deliver a killing blow to Tito's forces.
- e. However, since this spring the situation has been changing as follows:
 - (1) The Soviets have been continually building up the Satellite forces in size and efficiency.
 - (2) The Yugoslav forces, basically equipped with German and Russian equipment have found it most difficult to maintain and resupply their forces at peacetime consumption rates.

CONCLUSION

16. A Satellite attack on Yugoslavia within the next 12 months must be regarded as a serious possibility.









COPY NO. 27

NOTE BY THE U.S. MEMBER, INTERNATIONAL PLANNING TEAM

to the

HOLDERS OF I.P.T 54

SECRE,

CORRIGENDUM

Holders of I.P.T. 54 (Yugoslavia) are requested to make the following changes:

1. Page 2, Paragraph 5 b, last sentence, change Enclosure "B" to read Enclosure "A"; also, in paragraph 5 c, last sentence, change Enclosure "A" to read Enclosure "B".

2. Replace page 7 with the enclosed page 7 and destroy the removed page by burning.

Carreted 8/9/51

TOP SECRET COSMIC Corrig. to I.P.T. 54

