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SENIOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE

20-7-66

HIGH PRIORITY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING AND REVIEW ON PROGRESS

Report by the Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport (PBEIST)

This report is divided into four parts as follows:

Part I: Report on National Readiness Measures

Part II: Planning of Organization (International)

Part III: Planning for Alternative Port Facilities (National)

PART I. REPORT ON NATIONAL READINESS MEASURES

Reference: Annex to AC/98-R/2, I, (b), (2) and (3)

- 1. PBEIST, in connection with the study which the Senior Committee had asked it to carry out on this subject, requested member countries to submit documents on the organization of transport, the transport situation during the initial period, and readiness measures already taken, or to be taken, in the light of the new assumptions. PBEIST has received documents from the various PBEIST member countries through its three Regional Committees.
- 2. The information thus received can be divided up under the following chapter headings, which will constitute the framework of the present report:

A. TRANSPORT ORGANIZATION

- (a) Administrative and command organization
 - (i) centralisation and co-ordination;(ii) decentralisation;
- (b) Physical organization dispersal.


B. PREPARATION FOR MOBILISATION

- (a) Measures to be taken.
- (b) Measures already taken or contemplated.

C. CONSEQUENCES OF AN INITIAL NUCLEAR ATTACK

- (a) Transport position after this attack.
- (b) Measures to be taken.
- (c) Measures already taken or contemplated.

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A. ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORT

(a) Administrative and command organization

(i) Centralisation and co-ordination


- 3. This question had already been studied in various member countries before the new assumptions were adopted by the NATO Council. Reports received show that the countries are well aware of the need, now further accentuated under the new assumptions, for governments to exercise a central control over their means of transport.
- 4. In France, for example, where the centralisation of transport has already been highly developed in peacetime, it will be operative in wartime on the one hand at the central level, where all responsibility is vested in the Director General of Transport, who, on behalf of the Minister of Works and Transport, has authority over all forms of transport, and on the other hand, at the regional level, the Director General of Transport being represented at the head of each regional transport branch by an Inspector General for Bridges and Railways (Inspecteur General des Ponts et Chaussées), who is responsible for co-ordination in nearly all fields of transport.
- 5. The reports received show that, in some countries, coordination is not carried as far in peacetime as it is in France, but that governments are taking or are considering the various necessary steps either grouping the services or setting up joint committees in order to be in a position in wartime to exercise effective central control of all inland transport. In some cases, this involves the preparation of statutory measures. It should, moreover, be noted that railroad administration everywhere is highly centralised owing to the very nature of this type of transport.
- 6. The United States note details all the specific measures taken to ensure governmental control in wartime. Even though other governments may not be in a position to adopt any such overall solution to the problem, they can find much useful guidance in certain principles set out in the note.

(ii) Decentralisation

7. Generally speaking, decentralisation of transport organization raises no major problems owing to the existence of regional services in all countries, considerable authority being vested in the heads of these services, who could replace the central authorities in all fields if they were cut off from the latter or if the central authorities were prevented from exercising their functions. It is therefore sufficient to ensure, at these levels, co-ordination between the various means of transport. The attention of countries is drawn to the need for issuing the necessary directives in this respect forthwith.

(b) Physical organization - dispersal

- 8. The dispersal of administrations and of staff is not peculiar to transport and comes within the general framework of all the activities of member countries.
- 9. The dispersal of mobile transport equipment is being studied by the various countries.



10. Furthermore, certain countries are even planning a form of infrastructure dispersal which consists in providing or maintaining installations to replace those which might be destroyed by a nuclear attack (particularly in the context of port emergency planning).

B. PREPARATION FOR MOBILISATION


(a) Measures to be taken


- 11. To ensure immediate application of the measures planned, certain steps should be taken now:
 - (i) legislative measures such as an act on the requisition of civilian personnel and equipment;
 - (ii) measures in the administrative field and in particular the preparation of mobilisation record sheets for all the services concerned with a view to their use as guidance for switching over as quickly as possible to the wartime organization. It is obvious that once these documents have been prepared they must be kept up-to-date;
 - (iii) immediate appointment of the persons who will be entrusted with the various functions, at least in the case of the higher posts. Any who are not members of the peacetime organization will obviously have to be notified of the posts which they will have to fill;
 - (iv) choice of alternative locations, outside the danger areas, for the various agencies and preparations of the corresponding installations in peacetime;
 - (v) assessment of the communications requirements, a detailed list of which should be drawn up in agreement with the communications authorities who are responsible not only for transport but, in general, for all action which may need to be taken;

 - (vii) drawing up of specific dispersal plans in connection with item 9 above, which would be implemented automatically.

(b) Measures already taken or contemplated

12. These questions are now being studied in all countries and some have already taken certain measures; however, it would be premature to give a general picture of the results so far obtained. PBEIST is aware of the need for pressing these studies and is urging its members to do so.






C. CONSEQUENCES OF AN INITIAL NUCLEAR ATTACK

(a) Transport position after this attack

- 13. It is difficult, in such a short time, to give an accurate assessment of the transport position after an initial attack. The latest report of the PBEIST Southern Europe Committee (Greece, Italy, Turkey) gives estimates but it has not yet been possible to examine these figures or to check them against those obtained in the studies now being carried out by the other two Committees.
- 14. It is, however, already certain that the attack would cause breaches in the infrastructure of certain forms of transport, particularly railroads and inland waterways, isolating whole areas of varying size, within which it would nevertheless be essential to maintain transport. This means that road transport will assume greater importance since the finer network of road itineraries will ensure certain communications which cannot temporarily be maintained either by the railroad or the inland waterways networks in these areas.
- 15. Similarly, the destruction of the main ports would obviously have some repercussion on the internal transport position as there would be changes, sometimes very considerable, in the coastal starting points of the main routes for imports towards the interior.
- 16. It is clearly not essential to assess the exact position, particularly with respect to transport deficiencies, in order to realise that these deficiencies would be very great in all sectors.
- 17. As stated above, a very serious reduction in railroad capacity must be anticipated, particularly in respect of long-distance transport. It is pointed out, for guidance purposes, and with the above reservations, that, according to Italy, the residual capacity at the end of the initial 30 days' period, will be only 5 to 10% north of the line Rome-Ancona and 10 to 15% south of that line.
- 18. A serious reduction in road capacity must also be anticipated owing to the lack of sufficient mobile transport after wartime requisitioning and damage. The loss of potential may be estimated, as nearly as possible, at about 40%.
- 19. Inland waterways are probably more vulnerable but the amount of inland water transport in relation to transport as a whole varies considerably from country to country.
- 20. The geographical position of some countries will to a certain extent enable them to meet the deficiency in other means of transport by resorting to coastal vessels, though here also there will be reductions.

(b) Measures to be taken

21. These measures coincide with some of those enumerated above, in cases where they relate to the decentralisation of services and the dispersal of personnel and equipment.



- 22. Another measure would be to study lines of communication avoiding or by-passing the danger zones, even though the peacetime installation of such lines would involve expenditure bearing no relation to their economic value. Some countries point out that the implementation of such measures raises budgetary difficulties and requires special appropriations. This is, however a consideration which might be borne in mind when constructing new routes of economic interest.
- 23. A passing reference may be made to the studies for increasing emergency port facilities which will be dealt with separately.
- 24. Just as the deficiency of means of transport must be offset by the constitution in peacetime of stocks of commodities intended to support the initial (civilian and military) war effort, so too, must the physical means be provided for the maintenance and restoration of the traffic.
- 25. Immediate plans should be made to organize repair facilities, taking the manpower factor into account.

(c) Measures already taken or planned

26. Certain governments have already signed contracts with private firms who would be prepared, as soon as war broke out, to undertake the necessary repairs. The other questions are being studied.


PART II. PROGRESS REPORT ON PLANNING OF ORGANIZATION (INTERNATIONAL)

Reference: Annex to AC/98-R/2, I, b, (1)

A. CENTRAL EUROPE REGION: ACTICE

- 27. In its last report to the Council, examined by the Senior Committee under reference C-M(55)95, Part II, PBEIST had referred to the participation of ACTICE in Exercise Life-Line, stating that steps were being taken to introduce the necessary improvements in the organization and functioning of this agency. By the end of the first phase of these studies PBEIST had reached the following conclusions.
- 28. The international set-up should be based on the national transport organizations. The national authorities control their own transport facilities in peacetime and should continue to do so in wartime. This means that each country will have to co-ordinate its own transport facilities within its national frontiers. It is also in its own interests to do so for otherwise it could not make adequate use of its transport potential.
- 29. The national representatives will thus be able to supply ACTICE with all the data available to the national transport authorities which ACTICE may require.
- 30. After having studied the functioning of ACTICE, the origin and purpose of and the procedure for intervention in the form of requests for transport or means of transport, particularly in the light of the new assumptions, the Board felt that the organization of ACTICE, already outlined in AC/15-D/50(Final), remained valid; moreover, it was felt that the functions of ACTICE were not yet sufficiently clear-cut to decide whether any changes would be necessary in the present organization. However, under the new

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assumptions it is already clear that particular attention will have to be paid to its co-ordinating rôle in respect of the restoration of infrastructure facilities.


- 31. It is clearly desirable, however, that the wartime representatives of ACTICE member countries should as far as possible be the people who are familiar with the peacetime work of the Central Europe Committee in regard to ACTICE, as this would simplify the problem of the appointment of ACTICE representatives when ACTICE participates in allied exercises. For the same reasons, it would be advisable for the members of the wartime Secretariat of ACTICE to be designated in peacetime and to take part in allied exercises in their wartime capacity. The organization, location and functioning of ACTICE under the new assumptions are under continuing study by the Board and any developments will be reported in the next report to the Senior Committee.
- 32. The Board has also continued its study on the international telegraph and telephone communications needed by ACTICE, which will be notified to the Working Group on Wartime International Communication Requirements, which was set up by the Senior Committee at its last meeting, and which is to report on the subject.
- 33. With respect to the ACTICE terms of reference, as approved by the Council at its meeting of 12th May, 1954(1), PBEIST felt that these terms of reference were still valid, subject to paragraph 2 being modified to take into account:
 - (a) the accession of the German Federal Republic to NATO, which has taken place since the ACTICE terms of reference were approved;
 - (b) the need to co-operate with Denmark and Italy, countries adjacent to the Central Europe region, which could usefully co-operate, particularly in view of the new assumptions, in the marginal zones which might be cut off from the central zones.

34. It is therefore proposed that the Senior Committee should recommend the Council to modify paragraph 2 of C-M(54)46 as follows:

"2. This organization, known as the Authority for the Co-ordination of Inland Surface Transport in Central Europe (ACTICE), shall be composed of representatives of Belgium, the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and of the representative of the Allied Military Authority, appointed by SACEUR. Italy and Denmark shall also send representatives to ACTICE as observers."

⁽¹⁾ C-M(54)46 of 18th May, 1954, C-R(54)21, Item III.





B. SOUTHERN EUROPE REGION: ACTISUD

- 35. In compliance with previous directives, the PBEIST Southern Europe Committee has studied the setting-up of a Southern Europe Inland Transport Co-ordinating Authority, to be known as "ACTISUD", similar to ACTICE, an agency whose creation has already been approved by the competent authorities of the three countries Greece, Italy and Turkey by the Subordinate Commands concerned (CINCSOUTH, CINCAFMED), and by the United States Representative on the Southern Europe Committee.
- 36. The Southern Europe Committee has just submitted a proposal to this effect to PBEIST, but the latter has not yet had time to study all its implications and is therefore unable as yet to lay final proposals before the Senior Committee in respect of a recommendation to the Council.
- 37. It is, however, desirable to state forthwith, that the Southern Europe Committee has presented PBEIST with a constructive scheme which has received the tentative approval of the Board and will, moreover, be tried out during the transport exercises to be held in the Southern Europe region during the coming months. According to the results of these exercises, the proposed organization will then form the basis of subsequent discussions by the Board.


C. NORTHERN EUROPE REGION

38. The PBEIST Northern Europe Committee does not feel called upon, at present, to set up an authority for the co-ordination of transport between Denmark and Norway, as it considers the existing agencies adequate to secure the necessary co-ordination.

PART III. PLANNING FOR ALTERNATIVE PORT FACILITIES (NATIONAL)

Reference: Annex to AC/98-R/2, I, b, (4)

- 39. This part is divided into four chapters as follows:
 - A. Status of Studies on Improvement of Minor Ports, the Creation of Emergency Ports and Unloading Facilities and Assessment of Expenditures Involved
 - B. Requirements for Floating Equipment
 - C. The SHAPE Concept for Conduct of Port Emergency Planning
 - D. List of Port Targets



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A. STATUS OF STUDIES ON IMPROVEMENT OF MINOR PORTS,
THE CREATION OF EMERGENCY PORTS AND UNLOADING
FACILITIES AND ASSESSMENT OF EXPENDITURES INVOLVED

a. PLANNING FACTORS

40. Basic planning factors employed in national studies were as follows:

- (i) Thermo-nuclear conditions were accepted in the light of the new assumptions;
- (ii) Denial to NATO use of major ports during the initial period was accepted;
- (iii) Dispersal factors were applied for the reception of shipping by all available means other than major ports;
 - (iv) In the light of (i), (ii) and (iii) above, estimates were developed as to deficiencies to meet reception requirements. Studies then proceeded with a view to producing estimates of improvements in small ports, emergency anchorages and of beaches deemed essential to ensuring adequate reception capability.
- 41. The following estimates have been submitted by countries and are quoted unchanged; they are total estimates including both civilian and military requirements.

42. Southern region:

(i) Dry cargo

Shipping requirements: 124,000 tons per day Residual capacity: 62,000 tons per day Expansion plans and cost estimates: £31.5 million*

* This includes improvements for reception of POL in Turkey.

(ii) Dry cargo by Nation

Greece: Shipping requirements: 31,650 tons per day
Residual capacity: 17,680 tons per day
Expansion plans and


cost estimates: £3.5 million

Italy: Shipping requirements: 66,700 tons per day Residual capacity: 37,400 tons per day Expansion plans and cost estimates: £12 million

cost estimates: £12 million

Turkey: Shipping requirements: 29,400 tons per day Residual capacity: 8,100 tons per day Expansion plans and

cost estimates: £16 million



(iii) POL

Shipping requirements: Residual capacity: Expansion plans and cost estimates:

55,500 tons per day Studies incomplete

£11.5 million for Italy and Greece. Cost estimates for Turkey are included in the total assessment of expenses set forth in paragraph 42(i) above.

(iv) POL by Nation

Greece: Shipping requirements:

Residual capacity:

8,350 tons per day Adequate in ports. However, port clear-ance is deficient.

Expansion plans and cost estimates:

£9 million

Shipping requirements: 36,150 tons per day Residual capacity: Adequate in ports. However, port clear ance capacity is deficient.

Expansion plans and cost estimates:

£25 million plus 6 tanker berths for which cost estimate has not been completed.

Turkey: Shipping requirements: 11,000 tons per day

Residual capacity: Expansion plans and cost estimates:

Serious deficiency

Included in estimate reported in paragraph 42(i) above.

43. Northern region:

(i) Dry cargo

Shipping requirements: 32,000 tons per day 29,525 tons per day Residual capacity: Expansion plans and cost estimates:

(ii) Dry cargo by Nation

Denmark: Shipping requirements: 24,000 tons per day Residual capacity: ---

Expansion plans and

cost estimates:

Study not completed

Shipping requirements: Norway:

Residual capacity: Expansion plans and

cost estimates:

8,000 tons per day

£890,000 (in Norwegian ports only and includes increase of 600 t/day in coaster capacity. However, this will

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leave a total port deficiency of 2,300 t/day in the area which can be met by use of anchorages and lighterage).

(iii) POL

Shipping requirements: 17,000 tons per day.

Capacity adequate if Sixth and Seventh Slices of infrastructure are completed.

(iv)POL by Nation

Norway:

Denmark: Shipping requirements:

Residual capacity:

Expansion plans and

Study not completed

7,000 tons per day

Study not completed

cost estimates:

Shipping requirements: Residual capacity:

10,000 tons per day Study not completed

Expansion plans and cost estimates:

Study not completed

44. Central region

(i) Dry cargo

Shipping requirements: 315,000 tons per day Residual capacity: 160,000 tons per day

Expansion plans and

cost estimates:

£19 million (less Germany)

(ii) Dry cargo by Nation

Germany: Shipping requirements: 115,000 tons per day Residual capacity: 15,000 to 20,000 tons

per day

Expansion plans and

cost estimates

Not completed

Shipping requirements: 130,000 tons per day France: 50,000 tons per day

Residual capacity:

Expansion plans and cost estimates:

£16 million (partial

only)

Nether-

Shipping requirements: Residual capacity: lands:

Expansion plans and cost estimates:

30,000 tons per day 54,000 tons per day

£2.5 million (for emergency unloading facilities in southern part of country) will be needed to raise total capacity to 82,500 tons per day. Additional funds will be required for the

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anchorages in the northern part of the country to raise the total daily unloading capacity to 91,000 tons.

Belgium: Shipping requirements: 40,000 tons per day Residual capacity: 33,000 tons per day (Proposal under study to meet estimated deficiency of 11,000 tons per day by transhipment from Netherlands anchorages)

Expansion plans and cost estimates:

£685,000

45. POL

> Studies on requirements for improvements to minor ports and developments of emergency discharge facilities in the matter of reception of POL have not advanced sufficiently in Central Europe to permit a comprehensive report at this time.

46. POL by Nation

Germany: Shipping requirements:

Residual capacity:

Expansion plans and

cost estimates:

35,000 tons per day

Study incomplete

Study incomplete

France: Studies incomplete

Nether-

lands: Shipping requirements:

Residual capacity:

12,000 tons per day

Deficiencies are to be met by discharge at emer-

gency anchorages

Expansion plans and

cost estimates:

£1 million

Belgium: Shipping requirements:

Residual capacity:

Study incomplete An estimated reception deficiency of 9,000 cubic metres per day can be overcome through

reception by small

vessels.

Expansion plans and cost estimates:

None reported

47. Portugal

> (i) Dry cargo

> > Shipping requirements:


Residual capacity:

13,500 tons per day. It is estimated that an unspecified deficit can be met by use of anchorages and by expansion of small ports.

Expansion plans and cost estimates:

£6.7 million

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(ii) POL

Shipping requirements: Residual capacity: Expansion plans and cost estimates: 7,500 tons per day Not reported

Not reported

48. French North Africa: Algeria

Report has not been completed.

49. United Kingdom

(i) Dry cargo

Shipping requirements: Residual capacity: Expansion plans and cost estimates: Estimate not furnished 18 million tons per year

£7.3 million (see paragraph 50(iv) below)

(ii) POL

Shipping requirements:
Residual capacity:
Expansion plans and
cost estimates:

Estimate not furnished Not specified

£1 million

b. <u>IMPLEMENTATION</u>

50. Implementation of programmes for increasing emergency discharge capacities are reported as follows:

(i) Greece

Considerable expenditure has been made on improvements of minor ports. These expenses are in addition to the expansion plans indicated in paragraph 42 above.

(ii) Portugal

A part of the work involved in the expansion plans reported in paragraph 47(i) above has already been started. Estimated completion date of entire programme is 1960.

(iii) Turkey

Improvements are in hand at the small ports of Mersin and Felthiye.

(iv) United Kingdom

Moorings for 120 berths have been laid in anchorages. Programme for augmenting capacity of the smaller ports by dredging and repair and for creating additional barge discharge points is three-quarters complete. Nine existing deep-water berths (outside major ports) have been made available for general cargo. A reserve of mobile cranes has been created. Floating grain elevators for use in anchorages have been acquired, together with a number of smaller shore-based grain handling plants.





B. REQUIREMENTS FOR FLOATING EQUIPMENT

Through port emergency studies and military appreciations recognition has been given to a need for floating equipment as a means to aid in the reduction of certain cargo reception deficiencies. The following estimates have been submitted by countries and are quoted unchanged; they are total estimates including both civilian and military requirements.

a. Southern region:

Greece requires the following:

20 LCU

74 LCM

29 Tugs (harbour)

29 Launches

160 Lighters

10 Oil barges

10 Water barges

100 DUKWs

8 Floating cranes

Estimated cost: £9 million.

53. Italian needs are:

59 LCU (i)

298 LCM

31 Tugs

65 Causeway pontoons 6,100 metres, "Rescaux Sommerfeld"

Estimated cost: £17.4 million.

(ii)other mobile equipment to increase the capacity of ports and emergency anchorages:

> mobile cranes: 960 forklifts: 387 38 bulldozers:

11 road tankers:

61 tractors:

i.e. an estimated additional amount of £3.3 million.

(iii) for the protection of shipping in emergency and other anchorages, fixed and mobile installations are necessary;

> estimated additional amount: £7 million.

Turkey requires the following:

108 LCU

504 LCM

147 Tugs

156 Barges

67 DUKWs

147 Floating cranes

Estimated cost: £40.7 million.

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b. Central region:

- 55. The deficits in small floating craft required for use in emergency ports are under consideration by the various national authorities. They are not all yet in a position to give any but a very rough estimate, for in most cases the detailed national planning has not yet reached a stage where their requirements for these craft can be estimated with any degree of accuracy.
- 56. The study relating to floating equipment for the Federal Republic of Germany has not yet been completed. Un-loading from ocean ships on to anchorages and emergency unloading installations will be carried out through small craft and it is highly probable that the corresponding needs will be substantially greater than the capacity of floating equipment now in operation.
 - 57. The Netherlands, where the emergency port plan is in the course of preparation, estimate that apart from some naval patrol vessels their full requirements can be met from the fleet of craft already operating on their own internal waterways system.

58. Belgium estimates the deficit as follows:

(i) Military requirements

No.	Item	Estimated cost
38 9 9	Super DUKW LCM 6 LCM 8	£142,857 £128,571 £128,571
		£399,999

(ii) Essential civil requirements

38 18 18	Super D LCM 6 LCM 8	DUKW	£142,857 £257,142 £257,142
	,		£657,141
20	Coastal	ships (1.000 tons)


Coastal ships (1,000 tons) or LST or LSM
4 Tankers (from 2 to 3,000 tons)

Cost estimate: £6 million.

59. (i) France estimates the requirements as follows in order to equip all the emergency ports which appear to be necessary to fulfil all the requirements of the various members of NATO which may have to use the communications systems of France:

50	LCU		s. £			
800	LCM					
750	DUKW I	9				
50	Pontoons	NL	1. Land			
450	Canal ba					
128,000 t	ons coasting	vessels or	r vessels	type	LSM	or
	LST in l	ieu.				

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France hopes to provide from within her own resources:

40 LCM

300 **D**UKW

40 Coasters

450 Barges (if it has been possible to carry out the evacuation of the Rhine successfully)

(iii) Therefore France will require:

> 50 LCU £ 4,081,000 760 LCM £11,632,000 £1,836,000 450 DUKW I 510,000 50 Pontoons NL 88 Coasters (of 1,000 tons each) or

LSM or LST £26,938,000

C. Northern region:

60. Denmark:

216 lighters (100 TDW capacity each)

18 tugs (b)

- (c) Coastal tankers for total lift of 8,000 cubic metres in units of up to 3,000 cubic metres
- Landing ships estimate incomplete

(e) Cost estimate incomplete

61. Norway:

Norwegian needs are given without cost estimates. However, requirements by number and type of floating equipment are as follows:

300 lighters of 100 TDW

45 tugs of 300 HP, 32-54 coastal tankers of 1,000 TDW

d. Portugal:

Requirements estimated for 100 landing craft, 7 small tankers and 10 fuel barges total £2.85 million.

French North Africa: Algeria e.


63. A report is being prepared on this subject.

f. United Kingdom:

Studies thus far reported have not developed any specific requirements. However, the conclusion has been reached that sufficient floating equipment and craft are not available to meet military and civil requirements for port facilities.

Mediterranean (CINCAFMED):

65. A 1955 study indicates a logistical requirement for 28 landing ships and 16 landing craft. It is felt that a reappraisal under the new assumptions may increase this number. No cost estimate has been made.



C. THE SHAPE CONCEPT FOR CONDUCT OF PORT EMERGENCY PLANNING


- 66. The SHAPE concept for the conduct of Port Emergency Planning envisages the employment of 3 separate studies as follows:
- (i) A study by national authorities under an assumption of denial to allied use of all major ports. This is calculated to develop the likely residual reception capacity and the maximum requirements for emergency discharge facilities under the worst situation. This study is being co-ordinated by PBEIST Port Emergency Planning Group.
- (ii) A study by competent authority to define enemy effort required to produce the conditions of the assumptions being used in the PBEIST Study ((i) above). This will result in an authoritative evaluation based upon likely thermo-nuclear effects of an all-out attack upon major allied ports in Europe. This study has been undertaken by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (iii) A study by SHAPE to develop a current approciation of enemy capabilities and intentions concerning NATO ports in various time frames. This will have to be reviewed periodically and modified as warranted as estimates of enemy capabilities and intentions change.
- 67. Under this concept, the estimates resulting from the SHAPE study and subsequent reviews can be compared to the evaluation established by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff study (66(ii) above) from which conclusions may be drawn as to the probable extent of damage to be anticipated for a particular planning phase. Based upon these appreciations, periodic planning guidance can be furnished to PBEIST and national authorities to serve as a current guide in estimating the likely residual reception capacity and requirements for alternate port facilities. This guidance would, of course, take into consideration the probable course of enemy action against other priority targets such as allied atomic production and delivery capabilities, centres of government, industrial and communication centres, etc.
- 68. It is believed that the above concept will permit SHAPE to furnish the required military guidance as approved by NAC and published in paragraph 5 (1)(b) of C-M(54)75.

D. LIST OF PORT TARGETS

References: C-M(54)75 AC/98-D/14(Final), Annex A, Part I AC/98-R/2, I, paragraphs 17, 18 and 20

69. Early in 1956, before the Senior Committee had held its first meeting, the Port Emergency Planning Group prepared, on the basis of the new assumptions, a list of the port targets revealed as of over-riding importance viewed in the light of these assumptions. This list is given in the second column of the attached table. It should be mentioned here that this listing was effected by the countries concerned in conjunction with the allied military authorities of the regional Commands, and was accepted by PBEIST Port Emergency Planning Group without any attempt at co-ordination. Moreover, the lists compiled were practically confined to major ports suitable for the unloading of dry cargoes, and disregarded certain naval bases and POL discharging facilities which might present an equal importance as targets for atomic attack.

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- 70. This list did not tally with the one drawn up by the Senior Committee (document AC/98-D/14(Final), Annex A, Part I), shown in the third column of the table at annex.
- 71. PBEIST discussed at length whether only the list produced by the Senior Committee should be used or whether, for the work of the Port Emergency Planning Group, the list it had produced could still be regarded as valid. The following is the gist of the arguments put forward:

a. <u>In favour of substituting the Senior Committee's</u> list for that of the Port Emergency Planning Group

72. The various Boards and Committees must base their studies on identical assumptions for if they do not, there will be regrettable discrepancies. To cite an example, even within a Board as homogeneous as PBEIST, it would be anomalous for the Port Emergency Planning Group, because it was so regarded in its own list, to assume that a given port had been destroyed, while the Working Groups dealing with inland surface transport, using the Senior Committee's list where the same port has not been mentioned, were carefully working out the measures required to ensure the clearance inland of the imports which the Port Emergency Planning Group considered as cancelled.


b. In favour of retaining the Port Emergency Planning Group list for the studies of that Group

- 73. This list served as the basis of the Group's studies long before the Senior Committee's list was issued. It was used for the assessment of residual capabilities, for planning the expansion of emergency reception capacity, for determining the requirements of floating equipment and shore—based maintenance facilities as well as for the preparation of cost estimates. If the Senior Committee's list had to be substituted for that of the Planning Group, a great deal of the work would have to be done all over again.
- 74. As indicated in Chapter C above, the surveys intended to give an accurate assessment of damage to ports are based on the Planning Group's list, and it is open to doubt whether the military authorities would be able to supply additional information with greater detail since the surveys were carried out voluntarily by the countries concerned and at their own expense.
- 75. Then again, as stated in Annex A, Part I of document AC/98-D/14(Final), the Senior Committee's list is only one of various possible lists, and was issued merely because it fitted into the framework of plausible assumptions. Although the two lists of ports contain significant differences, these scarcely affect global capacity.

c. Proposals by PBEIST

- 76. The course adopted by PBEIST is the following:
- (i) It has authorised the Port Emergency Planning Group to continue, for the time being, its studies on the basis of its own list.
- (ii) Since it considers, however, that a unified list is essential for future work, it has invited the various countries concerned to submit proposals for the modification of the Senior Committee's list as regards ports. The purpose of these proposals,

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which are given in column 4 of the attached table, is to reduce and where possible, to eliminate the discrepancies between the two lists.


77. Finally, PBEIST:

- (i) proposes that the Senior Committee authorise the Port Emergency Planning Group to continue provisionally its studies on the basis of its own list;
- (ii) aware, however, that acceptation of a common list is extremely desirable, recommend the Senior Committee to consider the desirability of revising its list on the basis of the amendments proposed by the various delegations;
- (iii) recommends the Senior Committee to give the instructions it will deem opportune on the continuation of the subsequent studies of the PBEIST Port Emergency Planning Group on the basis of the list of ports used so far by this Group, or, as an alternative, its replacement by the list of the Senior Committee.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.



(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country	Ports selected by the Port Emergency Plan- ning Group	Ports selected by the Senior Committee	Proposed amendments to the list of the Senior Committee
Belgium	Antwerp	Antwerp	Nil
Denmark	Copenhagen Aarhus	Copenhagen	Capital, port Aarhus
France	Marseilles Le Havre	Marseilles Le Havre	Lavera, POL port and oil storage
	Bordeaux	Bordeaux area	Bordeaux and Bassens
		St. Nazaire-Nantes port and oil storage	St. Nazaire, port and shipbuilding yards
e liter	n w	E 4	Donges, POL port and oil storage
î â		a ste a	Nantes, port and industrial centre
	- Wil	Toulon, port	Toulon, naval base
		Brest, port	Brest, naval base
	0) (1)	Cherbourg	(delete Cherbourg)
Al .	Rouen	Rouen	, "
) () () () () () () () () () (· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	La Pallice, port	(delete La Pallice, port)
		La Rochelle, port	(delete La Rochelle, port)
Ā ""	Dunkirk		Dunkirk, port and oil storage
North	Algiers	Algiers, port	5
Africa	Casablanca Oran		Oran
Germany	Hamburg Bremen Emden Bremerhaven	Hamburg Bremen Emden	Breme rhaven
Greece	Piraeus Souda Bay	Athens/Piraeus Salonika	Souda Bay



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<u>(1)</u>	(2)	(3)-	- (<u>4</u>)
Jountry	Ports selected by the Port Emergency Plan- ning Group	Ports selected by the Senior Committee	Proposed amendments to the list of the Senior Committee
taly	Genoa Naples	Genoa Naples	To be considered as thermo- nuclear targets
3 2	9 01 552 9 Pt	Tarento	(delete: Tarento replace by Bologna*)
UBLIQ	Leghorn Palermo Bari	Leghorn	
ECTURE PUBLIQUE	Ancona Brindisi Trieste Venice		Ancona Brindisi
Zether- Slands	Amsterdam Rotterdam	Amsterdam Rotterdam	Nil
DÉCLASSIFIÉ ce ce	Oslo Bergen Trondheim Stavanger Kristiansand	Oslo Bergen	Trondheim Stavanger Kristiansand
OSC West or tugal	Lisboa	Lisboa Oporto	Nil
Urkey	Istambul Izmir Iskenderun	Istambul Smyrne	Iskenderun
nited Kingdom	London Southampton	London Plymouth Southampton Portsmouth	
DECLASSIFIED	Bristol Cardiff Liverpool	Bristol Cardiff Liverp ool Manchester	Nil
DE	Hull Newcastle Glasgow	Hull and Immingham Tyneside area Glasgow Belfast	ST IN THE STATE OF
	Swansea	Swansea Edinburgh/Leith	

^{*} Important road and . railroad centre.

